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This article discusses human security as Japan’s unique diplomatic asset. Human security focuses on 
protection of individuals from a wide range of threats. In author’s observation, Japan’s human security 
policy has two dimensions. First, it is a global notion accomplished in the UN by Japan’s sponsorship and 
intellectual leadership. In order to universalize the concept of human security, Japan supported the posi-
tions of developing countries by respecting their policies of non-intervention or sovereignty, while miti-
gating western countries’ criticisms at their non-democratic systems or human rights records. However, 
when Japan practiced human security as a guiding principle of its ODA or development cooperation, it is 
more sharply conscious of the aims to promote liberal values such as democracy or human rights based 
on its national interests. Especially the current Abe administration has demonstrated such a consistent 
tendency in light of China’s growing influence on regional order or even alternative ideology to west-
ern-led “global governance.” This article argues such Japan’s human security policy’s double nature 
rather might be useful to compromise with China because it could offer flexible options between accom-
modation by elusive theory and competition by sharp practice.
Introduction
Human security is generally defined to aim to protect people from critical and pervasive threats to 
human lives, livelihood and dignity, and to enhance human fulfillment through protection and 
empowerment. It basically focuses on individuals who face a wide range of threats including natural 
disasters, environmental collapse, poverty, infectious diseases, civil wars or conflicts. The idea of 
human security emerged as transnational responses to such new type of threats or negative by-prod-
ucts of globalization in the mid 1990’s. Japan from the very early stage grasped the opportunity and 
sponsored human security for recognition as the universal notion in the UN. Meanwhile, Japan itself 
practiced human security for its foreign policy as one of important diplomatic pillars.
Today, however, amidst the escalating military tensions and changing security environment influ-
enced by China’s rising power, human security seems to retreat from the mainstream of security 
discussion. Furthermore, China is actively promoting its own notion of “community for shared future 
for mankind” as an alternative idea or a reform to Western-led global governance.1 It primarily empha-
sizes state sovereignty’s priority to civil society’s caring individuals and consequently envisions a 
picture of state-centric international system, in other words a returning to a classic idea of Westphalia 
system.2 This trend is uneasy to reconcile with Japan-promoted human security concept. For building 
a regional stability in Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific, China and Japan, two leading nations in the region, 
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need to manage the fundamental differences between their security concepts and value issues. From 
Japan’s perspective, it is desired to involve China with a “free and open” regional order by skillfully 
using the global notion of human security, which China also subscribed in the UN.
Based on the above viewpoints, this article examines approximately twenty years of history of 
human security as Japan’s foreign policy from its origin and rethinks its contemporary significance as 
a useful diplomatic measure. Beginning with reviewing Japan’s early motivation to advocate human 
security in the postwar global community, the first two chapters focuses on Japan’s efforts of multilat-
eral diplomacy to achieve the universally agreeable notion of human security in the UN. Then the 
third chapter discusses the evolving processes of Japan’s own implementation of human security into 
ODA policy, which was gradually shaped in rather strategic way to achieve national interests than just 
benign idea. Final chapter points out Japan’s human security policy under Prime Minister Abe is even 
increasing more political values and strategic objectives in reaction to China under Xi Jingping.
Overall it is found that Japan’s human security policy is shifting from non-controversial conceptual-
ization to sharper interpretation and practices. Therefore, Japan could utilize human security as diplo-
matic wisdom to deal with China in both compromising and competing ways. In author’s observation, 
this ambiguous dual natures of human security, elusive theory and sharp practice, would be rather 
useful to defend liberal values without causing decisive clash with China.
1.　Background of Advocating Human Security
The term of “human security” was first proposed in the 1994 UNDP report as a necessary new 
concept.3 After the end of Cold War, the report wrote that we must seek a new concept of human secu-
rity and a new paradigm of sustainable human development. The report regreted that for too long the 
concept of security has been shaped in interstate conflicts and equated with the threats to a country’s 
borders, and accordingly nations have sought arms to protect their security. The UNDP initially 
attempted to lay the whole concept for agenda setting of 1995 World Summit for Social Development 
at Denmark. However, the Summit did not substantially support the new idea because the proposal 
was regarded as a kind of ideological theory raised by experts on developing economy, otherwise 
another possible source of troubles between the international organizations and developing countries.4
However, Japan found the great potential in the UNDP ideas for own diplomatic future. In fact, in 
the 1995 Summit, Japanese PM Murayama Tomiichi stated that Japan’s ODA and international coop-
eration emphasized the social development of “human priority” in line with the UNDP concept.5 In 
the 1997 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the world environment, PM 
Hashimoto also stressed two points: our responsibility to future generations and global human secu-
rity.6 Subsequently, it was PM Obuchi Keizo who decisively took a leadership for uplifting the human 
security concept toward the international community. His brain staffs including academia, politicians, 
bureaucrats, and NPO members were actively studying Japan’s prospective platform which can 
promote multilateral diplomacy in the UN. Among all, Vice Foreign Minister Takemi Keizo had 
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already started the study on the UNDP report for years and strongly recommended human security as 
an integrated approach to deal with newly emerging various global issues. Particulary thinking of the 
ongoing Asian financial crisis, Takemi imagined many Asian vulnerable people would face hardship 
during the overcoming process with the IMF conditionality.7 Thus, the necessity of human security 
was mainly referred to in the context of Japan’s responses to suffering Asian neighbors from Asian 
financial crisis.
In May 1998 in Singapore, Obuchi then Foreign Minister expressed his compassion for socially 
vulnerable people and emphasized the necessary treatment based on “human security.” Soon after 
becoming Prime Minister, Obuchi announced a firm commitment in his speech titled “Toward the 
Creation of a Bright Future of Asia” in December 1998 at Hanoi. He described the coming future as “a 
century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity,”8 and addressed three areas for which Japan 
would make efforts. One of them was a policy of “placing emphasis on human security.” Obuchi 
explained; “human security is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human 
survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats. The economic crisis 
confronting Asian countries today has been a direct blow to their socially vulnerable̶the poor, 
women and children, and the elderly̶threatening their survival and dignity.” He announced to 
contribute 500 million yen (US$ 4.2 million) for the establishment of the “Human Security Fund” 
under the United Nations even during Japan’s own economic crisis.
PM Mori Yoshiro succeeded Obuchi’s strong commitment of promoting human security.9 At the 
UN Millennium Summit in 2000, Secretary General Kofi Annan presented a report with two key 
words; “Freedom from fear, freedom from want,” stressing the need to tackle the various global threats. 
The PM Mori declared at the Summit that Japan would uphold human security as one pillar of Japan’s 
foreign policy and called for the establishment of an international commission on human security to 
further study its concept. Following PM Mori’s proposal, Mr. Annan announced the establishment of 
the “Commission on Human Security” when he visited Japan in January 2001. Two leading figures, 
Sadako Ogata (then UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and Amartya Sen (then Master of Trinity 
College, Cambridge) were appointed Co-chairs. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
organized international symposia on human security to promote public understanding and awareness 
of this issue.
Thus, at the turn of century, Japan stepped ahead to sponsor human security. There were several 
important backgrounds. First, as Obuchi’s brains did, Japan was seriously looking for opportunity of 
international contribution. This was caused by the diplomatic “defeat” of the Gulf crisis and war with 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait from 1990 to 1991.10 Unable to play any positive role in the crisis and war, 
Japan became the target of international criticism and eventually offered $13 billion in support, which 
remained the subject of ridicule for its “checkbook diplomacy.” After the end of the conflict it sent four 
minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. Yet, it was recognized as a case of too little and too late. Therefore, 
Japan was looking for the ways to recover reputation especially in the UN by international “security” 




Meanwhile, Japan coincidentally had an experience to study an innovative concept of non-military 
security. In July 1980, one of the study groups under the sponsor of then PM Ohira Masayoshi 
proposed an idea of “comprehensive security strategy” (総合安全保障戦略), based on general under-
standing on a new international environment under declining American hegemony and emerging 
trends of international interdependence.11 The study report paid special attentions to non-military 
threats such as energy security, food security, or massive earthquake, and proposed relevant policy 
recommendations. For example, policy recommendations for energy security included means of 
storing energy, developing alternative energy resources, and strengthening ties with resource exporting 
countries. Japan’s severe experience of two “oil shocks” in the 70’s had given actual lessons to rethink 
Japan’s fundamentally vulnerability. Although the “comprehensive security” did not go mainstream of 
Japan’s security policy after the resignation of PM Ohira, it was partly transplanted as a kind of theo-
retical skeleton to Japan’s mounting ODA policy in the 1980’s.
Lastly, Japan’s proactive diplomatic efforts regarding human security especially around 2000 
included “hidden agenda.” It was related to an important step to realize the desire to gain a permanent 
membership of Security Council in the UN. As the UN basically comprised traditional military 
“collective security” system, in which Japan found no possibility of active role, broadening of the new 
horizons was essential for Japan.12 In the early 2000’s, parallel to advocacy of human security, Japan 
struggled for the reform of the UN to include Japan as a member of enlarged Security Council. 
However, it was in vain that in 2005, the same year the UN officially adopted the notion of human 
security after Japan’s strenuous efforts, the G4 Proposal jointly with Germany, India, Brazil was 
opposed by China, Korea, and even the US. Japan’s another goal to gain the membership failed.
2.　Competing Concepts and Japan’s Leadership in the UN
As of 2000, Japan’s initial effort was to define human security as a concrete concept, which should 
be acceptable to all countries and practicable primarily for Japan itself. One of the reasons why Japan 
was attracted by the 1994 UNDP report was that human security’s focus was mainly “freedom from 
want” on socio-economic front rather than “freedom from fear” on civil and political front. Japan, as a 
pacifist trading nation, was confident of own feasibility in initiative of the former front. However, there 
were other competing alternatives to the traditional military security concept. For example, in 1995 
the UN Commission on Global Governance introduced different two concepts; “security of people” 
and “security of the planet.” The report indicated the “primary goals of global security policy should be 
to prevent conflict and war and to maintain the integrity of the planet’s life-support systems. . . .”13 It 
clearly prioritized “freedom from fear” to “freedom from want.”
Other western nations such as Canada and Norway actively reacted to conceptualize human security 
by incorporating with more civil and political interpretation in line with conventional “human rights 
diplomacy.” Especially, Canada became Japan’s rival in the definition competition at the UN. The 1999 
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first Canadian policy documents entitled “Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World” 
had shown a much narrower picture on human security.14 In other words, human security is a wide 
and demanding security program which focused on general individual protection and empowerment 
and has been transformed into a post-conflict program for building peace. The Canadian definition 
put aside the question of reducing poverty and other issues of human development.
Japan initially hoped to insert “human security” to the outcome documents of 2000 Millennium 
Summit. However, during the robbing process, Japan learned that developing countries such as China, 
India, and Brazil showed anxiety that the concept would invite foreign intervention, otherwise abuse 
their “Right to Development.” Therefore, Japan believed Canadian interpretation of human security 
would be difficult to gain the agreements from developing country group. Facing these problems, 
Japan postponed the use of the notion of “human security,” while continuing the efforts of inserting 
the substance of human security. Instead, Japan proposed to establish the Committee on Human Secu-
rity as a study group. Meanwhile, Canada set up the International Commission for Interventions and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS), which had designed the concept of “Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” as a 
main element of human security. Actually, the 2001 ICISS report asserted “the principle of non-inter-
ference will be withdrawn before the international responsibility to protect,” in the case that states are 
unable to protect their citizens, or they themselves are jeopardizing their citizens.15 This reflected deep 
concerns for the reality of ethnic cleansing such as Rwanda case.
Despite Canada’s strong criticism,16 Japan did not change the original stance. In 2003, Japan-spon-
sored Commission on Human Security submitted the final report to the Secretary General. The report 
defined human security as “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human 
freedoms and human fulfillment” and called for a strategy of “protection and empowerment” to secure 
people’s lives, livelihood, and dignity. In response to the submission of the Commission report, Japa-
nese government quickly lobbied and campaigned to insert the notion of “human security” into the 
outcome document of 2005 World Summit. The main issue was to remove R2P from the general defi-
nition of human security. With support by Mexico and Chile, Japan successfully gained the UN official 
definition in accordance with its original interpretation. As a result, the Japanese and Canadian defini-
tions were distinguished and separately mentioned in different paragraphs. The paragraph 143 
mentioned Japan’s version of human security.17 This was the first appearance of the notion of “human 
security” in the official document of the United Nations. Canadian interpretation of human security 
was inserted as R2P in paragraph 138 and 139.
Nonetheless, some developing countries such as Brazil and Cuba still complained of the ambiguity 
of human security. In order to continue persuasion, in 2006 Japan, with cooperation of Mexico, estab-
lished “The Friends of Human Security.” It followed up the movements and mainstreamed Japan’s 
interpretation of human security. Meanwhile, Canada and Norway also established “Human Security 
Network” and started the similar activities to maintain their interpretations. The conceptual debate 
continued even after 2010. Responding to further concerns expressed by developing countries, in 2012 
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the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on the notion of human security.18 The resolution 
agreed that human security is an “approach” to assist Member States and adopted a “common under-
standing” on the major controversies.
This resulted in explaining human security in “is not” formats to distinguish from other concepts 
and actions. Main points are selectively summarized as below. First, human security primarily upholds 
the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. Second, the notion of 
human security is distinct from the R2P and its implementation. Third, human security does not entail 
the threats or the use of force. In line with the UN Charter, full respect for sovereignty of States, terri-
torial integrity and non-interference should be maintained. Fourth, human security does not replace 
State security. Fifth, solutions should be embedded in local realities and based on national ownership. 
Lastly, governments retain the primary role, and the international community is to complement and 
provide the necessary support to Governments, upon their requests.
Thus, overall, the human security approach resulted in maintaining an orthodox Westphalian order 
which put first emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference. Clearly, it defended claims of devel-
oping countries’ state-centric position. For Japan, the policy of antagonizing no country was necessary 
to complete an intellectual leadership in the UN. Thus, through such considerate procedures human 
security became the “Japan brand” concept, yet the substantial content became rather elusive by its 
all-inclusive nature, which is difficult to carry out at the practical level to produce the fruitful result.
On the other hand, Japan soon integrated human security with its national ODA policy. The nature 
of human security became more strategic and specific according to the evolution of Japan’s ODA 
policy practice as the next chapter describes.
3.　Implementation of Human Security in Japan’s ODA Policy
Japan’s ODA started in 1954 when it joined the Columbo Plan as a donor of technological assis-
tance, while it had been a recipient from the World Bank until 1966. Such experience of dual status of 
donor and recipient for years had shaped Japan’s later unique ODA policies such as putting emphasis 
on self-help of the recipient country.19 Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s, based on postwar national 
strategy or political aims for economic recovery, Japan’s yen-loan required Japanese companies’ partic-
ipation. Japan-tied assistance was criticized by both recipient and other donor countries as “egoistic 
economic animal” or “neo-colonialism.”20 In the 1970’s, with an emerging sense of international 
responsibility as a trade-surplus nation, Japan finally made yen loan untied and shifted its ODA policy 
to more recipient-oriented ideas and practices. In 1977, the government announced the “five-year 
doubling plan” of ODA and next year even modified into “three-year doubling” and initiated massive 
projects. Accordingly, Japan changed the nature of ODA into more emphasis on BHN (Basic Human 
Needs) and human resources development.
In 1989 Japan’ ODA amounts surpassed the US and from 1991 to 2000 Japan remained the world 
top donor status. Succeeding the above-mentioned idea of “comprehensive security,” Japan’s ODA was 
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recognized as an important Japan’s diplomatic means. Meanwhile, the diplomatic failure of the Gulf 
War especially gave an impact on reframing ODA policy to be more externally accountable as Japan’s 
international contribution. In 1991, Japanese government announced guidelines of its economic assis-
tance to developing countries. The government was to pay full attention to the following points; (1) the 
trends of the military expenditures of recipient countries, (2) the trends of their development and 
production of mass destruction weapons and missiles, (3) their export and import of arms, and (4) 
their efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of market-oriented economy, and the 
situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms.21
The last guideline evidently showed that before Japan started to advocate human security in the UN, 
Japan’s ODA policy already prepared the framework of supporting western country group’s argument. 
Furthermore, on June 30, 1992, Japanese government announced ODA Charter. In addition to the 
above four guidelines, the Charter addressed basic philosophies of ODA; (1) humanitarian consider-
ations, (2) recognition of interdependence among nations of international community, (3) environ-
mental consideration, and (4) support for self-help efforts of recipient countries. Japanese government 
explained its first ODA Charter as a meaningful product of combining Japan’s nearly 40years’ ODA 
history with post-Cold War international trends.22 However, soon it faced more serious needs to shape 
the policy again. Since the late 1990’s, owing to Japan’s economic downfall and financial difficulties, its 
ODA budgets decreased and consequently went under serious reconsideration. With limited financial 
resources, the nature of ODA was asked to be in more accordance with national interests.
It was under such situation that Japan started to connect human security with its ODA policy. In 
2003, while Japan’s UN diplomacy was very active, Japanese government reviewed ODA Charter. The 
three international trends namely “peace building,” “human security,” and “international development 
goals” were decided to be adequately stated in the new version. The 2003 Assistance Charter stipulated 
three basic policies which should be strategically pursued; (1) Supporting self-help efforts of devel-
oping countries, (2) Perspective of “Human Security,” and (3) Assurance of fairness.23 Then, Japan for 
the first time openly used the term of “strategically.” Since the 1970’s Japan’s ODA had emphasized 
altruistic nature or recipients-centric ideas, hesitating to express its self-centric aims. However, in 
2003, Japan was finally becoming a nearly “normal” country to reveal its “strategy.” Yet, inserting the 
notion of “national interest” was still carefully postponed after heated debate.
Thus, unlike the attitude in the UN, Japan’s interpretation of human security in practicing as foreign 
policy was formulated in more strategic ways with political objectives. This gap or contradiction 
became even more obvious when China emerged as Japan’s immediate security concern.
4.　China‒Japan Conceptual Security Dilemma?
Throughout the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, China launched the New Security Concept (新安全保障
観). which emphasized non-traditional security and multilateral cooperation. In such a liberal atmo-
sphere, when the SARS epidemic activated the discussions in 2003, human security was not totally 
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rejected, rather often positively introduced.24 However, Chinese academia soon found more negative 
dimensions. There two types of criticism appeared. One is about human security’s operational limita-
tion due to its conceptual vagueness. The other argument is usual one among developing countries, 
which concerns the frictions with sovereignty, state security, and right to development. However, 
Chinese versions have unique additional tendency. They view that human security discourses have 
tangible Western value orientation and the acclaimed paradigm-shift from the state to individual 
excessively downgrades the positive role of the state in dealing with various security agendas. Typical 
argument is that government as a “necessary evil” is very much Western invention and it is not a 
Chinese idea.25
Even though the definition at the UN sided with China’s understanding, China was always cautious 
to use the notion of human security. Externally, Chinese government preferred the notion of mankind 
security (人類安全), carefully avoiding the indication of individuals. Domestically, China promoted 
similar conceptual guiding principle of “people-oriented” (以人為本). This fact may lead an observa-
tion that even though human security is not frequently used as a term, there have been significant 
discussions leading to the consideration and implementation of various human security practices in 
China.26 However, it is also pointed out that the “Sinicized” form of human security does not result in a 
pattern of civil society empowerment.27
Xi Jinping’ China has actively reformed security concept and policy. During the Third Plenum held 
in November 2013, the creation of a new National Security Commission was announced. Xi stated that 
China is currently faced with the dual pressure of externally safeguarding national sovereignty, secu-
rity, and development interests and internally maintaining political security and social stability. He 
explained all kinds of increasing risks demand to establish a powerful and capable platform to coordi-
nate the whole national security work. The notion of security which the initiative refers to became 
“national comprehensive security” (総体国家安全), covering traditional and non-traditional, internal 
and external threats. Presupposedly the rule of Communist Party must be foremost secured.
In April 2014, at the first meeting of the new National Security Commission, President Xi stated that 
the security of people had to be the main objective and state security should in every sense serve the 
people and rely on people. However, as the security system primarily protects the Chinese Communist 
Party, it cannot be compatible with human security whose prior objective is individuals. Rather, in 
de-emphasizing state security, human security has possibilities to provide a “back door” toward human 
and ethnic rights or individual freedom within state, which China would firmly oppose.
On the other hand, Japan found own security environment in traditional sense increasingly severer. 
Amid the culmination of deteriorating China‒Japan relations after Japan’s nationalization of Senkaku 
island in September 2012, PM Abe Shinzo immediately after his inauguration in December of the 
same year started a fundamental reform of Japan’s national security policy. In such new security envi-
ronment, human security as Japan’s foreign policy was reexamined with more strategic definition. In 
February 2015 the Abe administration announced the Development Cooperation Charter.28 It even 
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changed the Charter’s name by omitting the notion of ODA. The reviewed points were influenced by 
whole strategic consideration decided by National Security Strategy on December 17, 2013. The basic 
philosophy, policies and approaches of the new Charter were harmonized with the “Legislation on 
Peace and Security” adopted later in March 2015.
In the new Charter, human security became a “guiding principle that lies at the foundation of 
Japan’s development cooperation.” It was fixed as one of the philosophies lined up with “cooperation 
for non-military purposes” and “equal partnership with developing countries.” Accordingly, 
“promoting human security” is listed as the second basic policy after “contributing to peace and pros-
perity through cooperation for non-military purposes,” before “cooperation aimed at self-reliant devel-
opment through assistance for self-help efforts as well as dialogue and collaboration based on Japan’s 
experience and expertise.” Compared to the 2003 Charter, human security came prior to the self-help 
efforts of recipient countries, switching their orders in basic policies.
Japan’s strategic word choices are found in other places. This is in accordance with Japan’s priority 
issues of “sharing universal values and realizing a peaceful and secure society,” which is clearly 
described in the same Charter. Universal values are defined as the establishment of the rule of law, the 
realization of good governance, the promotion and consolidation of democratization, and respect for 
basic human rights including women. Relevantly, the Charter sharply defined human security as “a 
concept that pursues the right of individuals to live happily and in dignity, free from fear and want, 
through their protection and empowerment.” The tone was quite different from the 2012 “common 
understanding” of the UN, which emphasized state security’s supremacy over individuals. Instead, the 
Charter declared that Japan’s development cooperation focuses on individuals especially those liable to 
be vulnerable. It also states that Japan will proactively contribute to promoting basic human rights, 
although seemingly women’s rights are most featured. Thus, Japanese government purposefully 
employed human security for a policy tool of Japan’s “value diplomacy.”
The term of “national interests” was explicitly inserted in the introduction part.29 Unlike the 
reviewing process of 2003 revision, no serious opposition occurred from the public. This means the 
notion of “national interests” was already familiar and acceptable to Japanese people. It was under-
standable because escalating territorial disputes with China became enough common concerns among 
majority of Japanese. Thus, logically connected to national interests in the governmental document, 
human security came to represent Japan’s policy to maintain liberal democratic values and even 
protect universal values such as human rights and individual freedom.
Conclusion
As reviewed in this paper, Japan’s human security policy had two dimensions. One is a demonstra-
tion of Japan’s intellectual leadership to achieve the universal notion of the 21st century in the UN. 
This efforts were done up until around 2010. It was perceived that Japan’s global diplomacy carefully 
considered the needs of developing countries while disregarding the western countries’ substantial 
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“human right” diplomacy. The other is Japan’s foreign policy to strategically ponder and carry out 
human security based on national interests. Since 2010, human security has evolved into the concept 
to represent Japan’s liberal political values in the international community. China’s growing influence 
on the regional and global order prompted Japan to reactively demonstrate own political values in 
connection with national interests.
Today, Japan’s interpretation on human security seems to return to “Conclusion of the Meeting of 
the G8 Foreign Ministers” (Cologne, June, 1999), before Japan started to conceptualize human secu-
rity. It simply stated; “We emphasize that crucial cornerstones of human security remain democracy, 
human rights, rule of law, good governance and human development.”30 It is interesting that, after 
nearly twenty years’ experience of human security diplomacy, Japan arrived in the old starting point. 
Yet, this paper does not argue that Japan’s human security should align only with western developed 
countries’ sides. Instead, it argues that human security, Japan’s unique global diplomatic asset, may 
have more potential to reconcile with China and explore compromising space in dynamic changes of 
regional and global order.
Human security is a unique wide and flexible concept. It can check China if used sharply, while it 
can still accommodate China if used loosely. Such Japan’s diplomatic ambiguity or multi-faceted char-
acter reminds us postwar Japan’s three diplomatic principles declared in 1957; (1) Assigning central 
importance to the UN, (2) Cooperating with the free world, and (3) Strengthening Japan’s position as 
a “member of Asia.”31 Harmonizing three rather contradictory principles was not easy, however at that 
time postwar Japan’s government intentionally left three agendas reflecting people’s wishes of those 
days in time of returning to the international community. Today more than 60 years later, Japan is also 
facing the similar puzzles and challenges. Human security could be positively reconsidered to solve 
Japan’s consistent diplomatic dilemma.
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